The Jiuguo bao appeal of 7 November 1935 is a prime example.
Heretofore there has been a consensus that this statement's assertion that under certain conditions Chiang might be included in the united front represented a call for unity with him. Not so says Sheng. Sheng stresses instead the anti-Chiang rhetoric of the article, and concludes that it was "not designed to encourage Chiang to form a united front with the CCP, but to discredit him." There are several problems with this conclusion. First, no one disputes that Wang Ming inched towards the idea of unity with Chiang. On the one hand, Wang saw the need to unite with him and reluctantly conceded that need in the 7 November article. On the other hand, Wang still saw Chiang as the enemy of the Chinese people. This inconsistency can be explained in either psychological or tactical terms. In terms of the former, it takes time for a person's mind to achieve what Robert Jervis calls irrational cognitive consistency. It took time, in other words, for Wang to convince himself that all arguments pointed in the same direction, that since Chiang was to be united with against Japan he was no longer a vile class enemy. In terms of tactical advantages, Wang may Secondly and more importantly, Wang Ming and the ECCI had every interest in maintaining the appearance of unity between Baoan and Moscow. Unity towards the outside is one of the fundamental precepts of democratic centralism. Had Comintern publications continued to refer to Chiang as "Commander" while the Red Army was making war in Shanxi, interrlal differences would have been made open to the public.
The idea that a desire to discredit a person (Chiang Kai-shek in this case) is an indication that that person is deemed to be outside the united front shows fundamental misunderstanding of the Leninist concept of a united front. The international communist movement during the 1920s and 1930s was filled with debate over the merits of a "united front from above" as opposed to a "united front from below." Much of this debate was about how best to discredit class enemies (social democrats, progressive bourgeois politicians and so on) with whom the proletariat might find it expedient to unite. To imagine that, from a Leninist perspective, a desire to "unite" with someone precluded efforts to "discredit" that person is simply wrong. In the event that Chiang settled with Japan, a well-armed CCP could be rather useful. A CCP-controlled state in China's north-west would be even better. But in termsiof contribution to enhancing Soviet security, Red guerrilla armies to harass Japanese forces or a Red buffer state south-east of Mongolia could not begin to compare with resistance to Japan by the ROC under Chiang Kai-shek. The Soviet government and the Comintern worked to induce Chiang to swing the ROC into resistance to Japan. One aspect of this was the Comintern's effort to push the CCP to moderate its policy towards Chiang. A major factor inclining Chiang towards settlement with Japan was fear that the CCP would use the opportunity of an ROC-Japan war to undermine GMD rule. Stalin wanted Mao to moderate CCP policy to ease these fears. But Stalin still needed to keep alive the option of a CCP buffer state should Chiang decide to appease Japan. Stalin wanted to keep his options open until Chiang and the ROC were committed against Japan, hence his expressions of willingness to arm the CCP and his support for the CCP's efforts to win over Zhang and Yang.
Forty years ago Allen Whiting found multiple and sometimes contradictory Soviet policies toward China during 1917-24.2 The contradictions between the requirements of these multiple policies sometimes created problems for Moscow, Whiting concluded, but Soviet leaders felt no need to forgo any possibly advantageous area of activity for the sake of logical consistency. Soviet policies in 1936 regarding the desirability of a CCP-GMD anti-Japanese united front and the creation of a CCP-led anti-Japanese state bordering on Mongolia seem to have been similar. The driving force of Soviet policy was not logical consistency but a desire to exploit all opportunities which uncertain future developments might prove to be profitable. It seems that Mao enthusiastically embraced some Soviet policies (the north-west strategy), but was not so enthusiastic about others (a united front with Chiang). Repeated Comintern directives were necessary to prompt him to adopt the latter policies.
The concept of "trust" plays, I believe, an inordinately large role in Sheng's analysis; he argues that since Stalin did not trust Japan and Chiang Kai-shek, it would not have made sense for him to push the CCP towards a united front with Chiang. There are two problems with this analysis. First, "trust" is an unmeasurable concept, at least unless one uses psychometric techniques. Debate about "trust" is a little like debate about theological propositions which are inherently unverifiable. Secondly, whether or not Stalin pushed the CCP towards a united front with Chiang was not a function of his "trust" in Japan, Chiang Kai-shek, or anyone else. I frankly doubt if Stalin trusted anyone, including his closest comrades. Even after the Sino-Japanese war began, Stalin continued to fear that Chiang would make peace with Japan and abandon the ROC's alignment with the USSR. As I read it, fear of abandonment and betrayal was a constant of the politics of that time and place.
Given his fear of a GMD or Japanese double cross, why would Stalin push the CCP toward a united front with Chiang? Precisely because of his awareness of the contingent nature of Chiang's and the ROC's alignments. Chiang's reluctance to "resist Japan" was based largely on his fear that the CCP would use the opportunity of SinoJapanese war to expand Red power. If Chiang could be persuaded that the CCP was willing to accept certain restrictions demanded by him, then he would be more willing to lead the ROC to "resist Japan" and Soviet security would be correspondingly enhanced.
There But he also felt that Moscow's frequent directives were often somewhat out of touch with Chinese realities. When this was the case, Mao would make some partial move to satisfy Moscow demands or interpret Moscow's orders in a way that he thought conducive to the expansion of revolutionary power in China. In the instant case this meant launching the Eastern Expedition, supporting the liang guan 
